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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRESDENT HAS POWER To ISSUE
REoESS COMMISSION To FEDERAL JUDGE WHEN VACANoy FIRST
ARISES DURING SESSION OF SENATE

A retirement created a vacancy on a federal district court two days
before the United States Senate adjourned sine die. Seventeen days later,
the President filled the vacancy by issuing a recess commission to the judge

who tried and sentenced petitioner for narcotics violations. After six years
of imprisonment, petitioner instituted a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,1
challenging his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial judge

had been commissioned in contravention of article II, section two of the
Constitution, which provides that the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the

Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for ....
The President shall have the power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
(Emphasis added.)
The district court rejected the petitioner's contention that the vacancy had
"happened" while the Senate was in session and that therefore the President
lacked power to make the recess appointment.2 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d
Cir. 1962).
The only federal case law regarding the President's power to make
recess appointments to fill vacancies which arose while the Senate was in
session consists of two old and contrary decisions, neither concerning judgeships.3 Although the issue was argued to the Supreme Court in Ex parte
128 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).

2 United States v. Allocco, 200 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The government argued that "happen" meant "happen to exist," not "occur." In addition to
disputing this, petitioner contended that the President has no power whatsoever to
make recess appointments of federal judges because of the life tenure requirement
of article III, and that, at least, judges sitting by virtue of such appointments should
not try criminal cases. Brief for Appellant, pp. 22-23. See generally Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court-ConstitutionalBut Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. Rxv.
124 (1957).
- Case of District Attorney of United States, 7 Fed. Cas. 731 (No. 3924) (E.D.
Pa. 1868); In the Matter of Farrow, 3 Fed. 112 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880). The court
in the present case erroneously believed the District Attorney decision to be unre-
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Ward,4 it was not decided because of the Court's invocation of the de facto
doctrine, which bars collateral attacks based upon technical defects in the
authority of the judge. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,5 which cast considerable doubt on the continuing
validity of Ex parte Ward, the present court rejected the applicability of
the de facto doctrine and decided the issue on the merits.
The articulated grounds for the present decision are two: a practical
argument based on the difficulty of obtaining rapid judicial appointments
should a vacancy arise near the close of a Senate session, and a high
evaluation of executive opinion and practice as an extrinsic aid in constitutional interpretation. In speaking of the slow, complex process of
selecting qualified federal judges and of the danger of "executive atrophy"
which might result from petitioner's interpretation,0 the court cited the
tremendous work load of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary in assisting the Attorney General and the
President in filling judicial vacancies. 7 The Court failed to note that this
"Herculean" 8s undertaking was the result of a unique circumstance-in
May, 1961, Congress created seventy-three new federal judgeships,9 thereby
increasing the number of vacancies to an unprecedented total.'0 Undoubtedly, delay in filling vacancies has been an important factor contributing to congestion in the courts." Yet the court gave no reason why
the necessary examinations of candidates could not, in many cases, be conducted in advance and a reserve of approved names be kept in readiness.
This procedure would be particularly effective in cases like the present one,
ported. Instant case at 714 n.14. It thus overlooked a long and thorough opinion
denying the recess appointment power, wherein judge Cadwalader stated:
There has not been opportunity of judicial contestation: The existence
of the power in question has not been legislatively recognised, has been denied
by the senate, has been practically asserted by presidents only, and has not
been exercised without constantly recurring suggestions by them of doubts
of its existence under the constitution: opinions of the attorney-generals have
been its only support; and in these opinions, other jurists of eminence have
not concurred.
7 Fed. Cas. at 744. Two other federal decisions consider the point by way of
dictum: In re Yancey, 28 Fed. 445 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1886) (judges equally divided);
Schenck v. Peay, 21 Fed. Cas. 672 (No. 12451) (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1869) (happen means
occur). State decisions interpreting parallel provisions in state constitutions have
also been divided. E.g., People v. Forquer, 1 Ill. 68 (1890) (occur) ; State v. Kuhl,
51 N.J.L. 191, 17 AtI. 102 (1889) (happen to exist).
4 173 U.S. 452 (1899).
r 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
6 Instant case at 714.

7 Instant case at 710-11.
8
Instant case at 710 n.10a.
9 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 44, 133 (Supp. 1961).

10 There were 107 vacancies during the first six months of the present administration. 86 A.B.A. REP. 503, 505 (1961).
"1H.R. REP. No. 215, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1961) ; U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1741 (1961). In the latter part of the Eisenhower administration, the average time between the creation of a vacancy and the subse-

quent nomination was reduced to three months. "This is probably as short a period
as can be hoped for, even under ideal conditions." 86 A.B.A. REP. 503, 507 (1961).
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in which the vacancy arose through the maturing of a resignation, not
through an unforeseeable event.' 2 The modern Senate is in session for
about eight months a year and is thus available for confirmation of appointments most of the time. In addition, federal judges can be and frequently
are transferred from one court to another and from retirement to active
duty. All judges sitting by designation have full judicial powers.' 3 Further,
the increased numerical strength of the federal judiciary now provides a
wider base over which additional work could be spread. 14 Under these
conditions, it is difficult to imagine that if judicial vacancies arising during
Senate sessions could not be filled by way of recess appointments, any
substantial paralysis of the judiciary would result.
The court perceived "nothing in the Constitution which indicates that
judicial appointments are to be treated differently from any other appointments subject to Senate confirmation." 15 Therefore the alleged impracti-

cality of the petitioner's interpretation is heightened by extending its
applicability to the executive branch. However, the provisions of article III
supply a distinction between the judiciary and the executive branches;
judges have life tenure, and their compensation cannot be diminished.
Since the recess appointment clause permits an exception to these rules
safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, it might well bear a narrower construction as applied to judges than as applied to executive officials.
Even if this distinction is rejected, the court's fear of governmental paralysis
seems unwarranted. Generally, the absence of a particular executive official
will mean, at worst, a temporary allocation of his functions to others; in
cases of true emergency, the Senate could postpone its adjournment in order
to fill a vacancy arising near the end of the session.
Aside from the merits of the practical arguments, the more important
question concerns the weight which these arguments, as well as executive
12 Mr. Justice White's nomination to the Supreme Court was announced two
days in advance of Mr. Justice Whittaker's retirement Brief for Appellant, p. 14.
1328 U.S.C. §§ 291-96 (1958). The following dialogue is from the floor of
the Senate:
Mr. ERviN. [Is it] not a fact that Federal district judges can be sent
from one district to another, and therefore there is never any necessity for
making recess appointments for Federal district judges?
Mr. HART. The law does provide for such transfer.
Mr. ERviN. The law also provides, with respect to the U.S. court of
appeals, that the chief judge may order any district judge within the circuit
to sit with the other members of the court of appeals with equal authority
to make decisions on cases; is that not true?
Mr. HART. That is the law, and it is a practice indulged in rather
frequently.
Mr. ERVIN ....
there is really no necessity for making a recess appointment to the U.S. court of appeals, is there?
Mr. HART. It would be my feeling that there is none, for that reason.
106 CONG. REc. 18142 (1960).
14 A major factor restricting the use of transfers on the federal level had been
an inadequate judicial expense allowance, but effective August 7, 1959, this allowance
was increased from $15 per day to $25 per day. Johnsen, Judicial Manpower Problems, 328 Annals 29, 34 (1960).
15 Instant case at 710.
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opinion and practice, should be given in the interpretation of constitutional
provisions. Extrinsic materials have been quite commonly used in statutory
construction, 16 but statutes are "expressions of policy arising out of specific
situations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends ;" 17 generally,
they are intended to meet temporary conditions and are construed by the
courts while those conditions exist. The Constitution, on the other hand,
is a relatively permanent document which establishes the framework for an
entire governmental system. This difference counsels greater caution in
interpreting the Constitution, but it may also permit greater flexibility in
reading the language in order to insure the viability of the system which
has been created. The extent of this flexibility depends in part upon the
nature of the activity being regulated. Much flexibility is necessary, and
presumably was intended, in interpreting general provisions limiting the
federal government's powers over the economy; the framers could not have
foreseen the complexities and exigencies of a modem industrial society.
Consequently, the meaning of the commerce clause, the due process clause,
and the taxing power must be altered in light of contemporary conditions.' s
In contrast, the recess appointment clause need not be sensitive to societal
change. Furthermore, the language of this clause is relatively specific.
These factors of foreseeability and specificity indicate that the flexibility of
interpretation of other provisions is not permissible when interpreting the
recess appointment clause. 19
Interpretation must begin with a presumption in favor of the language
-that the framers meant what they said.20 In the present case, common
usage of words clearly favors the petitioner's interpretation.2 ' When there
is room for doubt, extrinsic materials contemporaneous to the framing of
the instrument can be of value in elucidating the purpose underlying the
language in question, but here they are of little assistance. Although
Hamilton's emphasis in The Federalistupon the necessity of an independent
judiciary and the corollary of life tenure, now secured by article III, sup16 The Supreme Court has overridden the literal meaning of a statute in deference to its purpose. Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945) ; Church of The Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
It has referred to congressional
committee reports. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384

(1951) ; United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940) ; Caninetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 496 (1917) (dissenting opinion). The Court has also
considered the rulings of executive agencies and independent commissions, United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, supra, and debated at length over congressional

acquiescence through silence and inaction, Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61
(1946).
17

Frankfurter, Some Reflections on, the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUm. L. REv.

527, 533 (1947).
18 National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19 Cf. id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2
o Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 529, 550 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.) ; see TenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CALmi. L. Rxv. 287, 289-90 (1938).
21 The court apparently conceded this. Instant case at 710.
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ports a strict construction of the recess appointment clause,22 his specific
discussion is ambiguous. 23 The records of the Constitutional Convention
are unenlightening.2 4 The only item of significance from the early Congresses, in which some of the framers were still present, is an interpretation
of similar language from the now-repealed article I, section 3, clause 2:
"[I]f Vacancies happen . . . during the Recess of the Legislature of any
State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the
next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies." 25
Under this provision, the Senate in 1794 refused to seat a Senator appointed by his governor during a recess when the vacancy had existed
during a session of the state legislature. 26 The present court chose, however, to reject the most likely meaning of the language and the early,
admittedly inconclusive, extrinsic materials; instead, it based its reasoning
on the presumption that the framers intended to create a viable system and
stated that "it is inconceivable that the drafters . . . intended to create such
a manifestly undesirable situation." 27 Only in this context are its practical
arguments important; it seems clear, however, that petitioner's interpreta22 "The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in
a limited Constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491 (Wright ed. 1961)
(Hamilton).
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution,
and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of
justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by
a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or
by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence.
Id. at 495. The present political influences in the processes of selection of federal
judges indicate that Hamilton's fears are by no means outdated. See Miller, Federal
Judicial Appointments: The Continuing Struggle for Good Judges, 41 A.B.A.J. 125
(1955); Miller, The Selection of the Federal Judiciary: The Profession Is Neglecting Its Duty, 45 A.B.A.J. 445 (1959) ; Brief for Appellant, pp. 26-28.

23

[A]s it would have been improper to oblige . . . [the Senate] to be

continually in session for the appointment of officers, and as vacancies might
happen in their recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to

fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize
the President, singly, to make temporary appointments during the recess of
the Senate ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 438-39 (Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
As to the mode of appointing the judges: this is the same with that of

appointing the officers of the Union in general, and has been so fully discussed in the last two numbers, that nothing can be said here which would
not be useless repetition.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
24 The recess appointment clause was first inserted in the closing days of the
Convention, referred to the committee on style, reported out, and adopted without

debate. See 2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
533, 540, 574, 600 (1911). There is no indication whether the requirement of life
tenure for federal judges was meant to be qualified by the recess appointment power.
Although there was prolonged debate over the appointment process in general, the
present problems were apparently unforeseen. See 1 & 2 FARRAND, THE REcoRDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 (1911).

25 While this provision was in effect, Senators were chosen by state legislatures.

It was repealed by U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII.
26 3 ANxALS OF CONG. 78 (1849) [1793-1795].
27 Instant case at 710.
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tion, although causing some inconvenience, would not lead to the suggested
28
governmental paralysis
The court buttressed its position by the use of extrinsic materials substantially subsequent to the framing of the instrument, such as congressional
and executive opinion and practice. The Supreme Court has made some
use of construction from subsequent practices, but has done so primarily
to settle questions on which the Constitution contains no relevant language; 29 to decide cases in which there have been numerous opportunities
for objection in the courts to a particular executive usage; 30 or to affirm a
31
conclusion reached by other means.
The inference of congressional acquiescence in judicial or executive
opinion and practice is at best a tenuous one to draw. In dealing with the
Constitution, such acquiescence, unless that of the very early Congresses,
should be of little interpretive value. The present court reasons that
Congress has implicitly recognized the President's power to make recess
appointments to fill vacancies which arose during a session of the Senate
by authorizing payment of salaries to some persons so appointed.32 The
statute cited, however, contains that authorization only as an exception to
a general negative policy:
No money shall be paid .
. to any person appointed during the
recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy in any existing office, if the
vacancy existed while the Senate was in session and was by law
required to be filled .
. with the advice and consent of the
Senate . . . . The provisions of this section shall not apply (a)
if the vacancy arose within thirty days prior to the termination of
the session of the Senate .

.

.

.

See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
The first reported use was in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 115 (1803),
where the practice of Supreme Court judges sitting as circuit judges was said to
settle their power to do so. Later the rule developed that the importance of practical
construction varies with the degree of ambiguity. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,
27 (1892). In Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 369 (1932), it was held that when
28

29

a state constitution required the governor's participation in the legislative process,
practice helped to establish the necessity of his approval of legislative redistricting
under the times, places, and manner clause, article I, § 4. In Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 249 (1901), the Court said: "The Constitution itself does not answer
the question. Its solution must be found in the nature of the government created
by that instrument, in the opinion of its contemporaries, in the practical construction
put upon it by Congress, and in the decisions of this court."
30 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 170-71 (1926).
In United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), in a brief discussion of this line of cases,
the Court classified long-continued action of the executive as important "on the
presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice." Id. at 472-73. However, the opinion went on to point out: "nor do these decisions mean that the Executive can by his
course of action create a power." Id. at 474.
31 See Okanogan Indians v. United States, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (The Pocket
Veto Case); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925); Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 363 (1867); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
32
Instant case at 714.
83 54 Stat. 751 (1940), 5 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
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The forerunner of this statute, passed in 1863, contained no such exception. 34 Congress may have reluctantly accepted a fait accompli while
indicating a preference for a different interpretation, but even its clear endorsement of the power should not suffice to amend the Constitution.
A connected problem concerns the significance accorded in the present
case to a long line of opinions of the Attorneys General.3 5 While these are
entitled to some regard, 36 several factors here detract from their value.
An Attorney General is likely to give an affirmative answer when questioned
by the President regarding executive powers, and the taking of an oath to
uphold the Constitution does not, as the court suggests, 3 7 remove this
natural bias. Further, the first of the fourteen opinions construing article
II, section 2, that of Wirt in 1823, did not relate to a judicial vacancy and
was based in large part upon practical arguments similar to those of the
present court. It was not concurred in by early commentary,38 and despite
its precedential value, the subsequent opinions indicate a doubt on the part
of many Presidents. In the only one of these opinions concerning a judicial
vacancy, Attorney General Bates stated: "If the question were new . . .
I might have serious doubts. . . . But the question is not new. It is
settled . . . by the continued practice of your predecessors, and the
reiterated opinions of mine .

.

.

."

9

Finally, the opportunities for

objection to these opinions in the courts have been limited by the fact of
subsequent confirmation of recess appointees, the de facto doctrine,40 and
the simple lack of awareness of the issue.
The court seems to have reached a just result in the case before it,
and this may be an inarticulated basis of the opinion. There was no attack
upon the trial judge's capabilities nor upon the fairness of the trial and
sentence. Petitioner stands convicted of a serious crime, and there is a
natural reluctance to free him on what appears to be a technicality, albeit a
constitutional one.41 Furthermore, as the court indicates, the potential evils
of "unconstitutionally" sitting recess judges are unlikely to materialize; 42
34Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. xxv, § 2, 12 Stat. 646. Further, the only indication
of the opinion of early Congresses in which some of the framers were present favors
the opposite interpretation. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
35 Instant case at 713-14.
3
See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 3486 They are by no means controlling.
49 (1939). Sometimes a Supreme Court Justice will reject opinions which he wrote
as Attorney General. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176-78 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring).
37 Instant case at 713.
38 Story clearly disagreed. 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE: CoNSTIUTIoN OF
THE UNiT-D STATES 409-12 (1833). See also Judge Cadwalader's discussion in Case
of District Attorney of United States, 7 Fed. Cas. 731 (No. 3924) (E.D. Pa. 1868).
39 10 OPs. Avr'Y GEN. 356 (1862).
40 See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
41 The court did in fact acknowledge that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), have placed constitutional defects above the "technical" level. Instant case at 706-07.
42 Petitioner had argued that the President might, by use of the recess power,
completely bypass the requirement of Senate consent. The court reasoned that this
was unlikely, in view of past experience and the character of the office of President.
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in all probability, persons tried by such judges will receive fair trials. And
in any event, any prejudice resulting from the trial judge's lack of life
tenure would be most difficult to prove. But these considerations bear upon
the de facto issue-whether petitioner should be permitted collaterally to
attack his conviction by challenging the judicial appointment-and not
upon the meaning of the constitutional clause in question. The two
problems should be kept separate. By first verbally discarding the de facto
doctrine, the court placed itself in a position in which the policies behind
that doctrine were likely to prejudice the determination of the constitutional
issue. This may explain the court's undue stress on practicality and
executive practice and opinion, but its process of reasoning tends to distort
constitutional determinations and may not always lead to the "just" result.

FULL FAITH AND O1REDIT-Ix AoTION oN FOREIGN WRoNGFUL DEATHa STATUTE, FoRUM MUST APPLY STATUTE'S DAMAGE,
LImITATION

Plaintiff's decedent perished in an airplane crash in Massachusetts.
Plaintiff, a New York citizen, sued the carrier, a Massachusetts corporation, in the Southern District of New York under the Massachusetts
wrongful death statute.' She obtained a jury verdict of $160,204.65 after
the trial judge refused to apply the $15,000 damage limitation of the Massachusetts statute. In reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting, held that the failure to apply
the limitation was a violation of the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1962).*
The long-prevailing choice of law rule in tort cases, including wrongful death actions,2 has been that the law of the place of injury governs. In
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,3 the New York Court of Appeals
departed from this rule, stating that when the forum has a strong public
Instant case at 714.

Petitioner also contended that congressional attitudes might

affect sentencing practices of judges not yet confirmed, citing the language of a
Senator on the floor of the Senate criticizing a federal judge for laxity in sentencing
narcotics violators. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 26-28.

1 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
* As this Comment was going to press, the court, on rehearing en banc, departed

from the panel opinion and affirmed, 6-3, the judgment of the district court as modified
by the panel's unanimous holding on the issue of prejudgment interest. The opinion,
written by Kaufman, J., who dissented in the panel opinion, adopted the view that a
state having substantial connections with the transaction in dispute has a legitimate
interest which it may effectuate constitutionally by applying its own law. Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., No. 27350, 2d Cir., Nov. 8, 1962 (en banc).
2 See, e.g., GOODRICH, CoNFLIcT OF LAws §§ 92-94, 102-105 (3d ed. 1949).
3 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). This case was another
wrongful death action arising out of the crash that killed the present plaintiff's decedent.
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policy-in that case, a state constitutional prohibition against damage limitations in death actions 4 -which conflicts with the law of the place of
injury, it is not obliged to follow that law. 5 This position is essentially
a manifestation of the "governmental interest" theory-that the forum may
constitutionally apply its own law when it has a substantial interest in the
transaction giving rise to the litigation." Although this approach has been
employed or approved by the Supreme Court on several occasions, 7 the
present decision, by declaring the Kilberg choice of law rule unconstitutional, holds, in effect, that the only acceptable choice of law in this factual
setting is that of the place of injury. 8
The majority, in deciding Pearson, relied most heavily on Hughes v.
Fetter 9 and First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' 0 cases in which
wrongful death suits were dismissed because of the forums' statutory policy
against entertaining foreign wrongful death actions. After finding that
the forums had no real policy against wrongful death actions because they
heard such actions if based on their own statutes, the Supreme Court
reversed in both cases, holding that this discrimination against foreign law
was repugnant to the unifying purpose of the full faith and credit clause.:"
These decisions do not control the present case, for here the forum entertained the cause based on the foreign statute.'
Indeed, the Hughes Court
explicitly distinguished the situation in which the forum heard the foreign
cause of action and then chose to apply its own substantive law.' 3
The majority in the present case gave little attention to other cases
elucidating the Supreme Court's attitude toward application of forum law
to cases arising from multistate activity. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n,14 an employee sued for workmen's compensation
N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
5 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1961)
4

(dictum).
The court also supported its position by characterizing measure of damages as "procedural." See id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
6 A forum may also refuse to entertain certain suits on grounds of public policy.
See discussion of Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), and First Nat'l Bank v.
United Air Lines Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952), in text accompanying notes 9-13 infra.
See generally CHEATHAm, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REESE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS 369-70, 373-74 (4th ed. 1957).
7 See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ; Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935). These cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes
14-26 infra.
8 See instant case at 140 (dissenting opinion).

9 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
10342 U.S. 396 (1952).
11341 U.S. at 612; 342 U.S. at 398. In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S.
514, 518-19 (1953), it is clearly stated that discrimination was the essence of these
decisions.
12 But the majority were not persuaded by this distinction.
'3 341 U.S. at 612 n.10. See discussion of this distinction in instant case at 144-45

(dissenting opinion) ; Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9, 30 n.90 (1958).
14 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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in California, where the employment contract was made, although the injury
occurred in Alaska. Full faith and credit to foreign law was asserted as a
bar to application by the forum of its own compensation statute. The
Court held that California's application of its own law did not violate the
Constitution. 15 Any reluctance-either because the action had both tort
and contractual elements, or because of the unique administrative considerations involved in workmen's compensation cases 10 -to conclude from
Alaska Packers that application of the law of the place of injury is not
always constitutionally required is dispelled by the Court's acceptance of the
governmental interest approach in other areas. 17 In Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp.,'8 for example, a domiciliary of Louisiana, allegedly
injured there by a defective product of a foreign corporation, brought an
action in Louisiana against the corporation's insurer under a "direct action"
statute.' 9 The insurer claimed that the insurance contract was negotiated
and delivered in other states and contained a clause binding under the laws
of those states prohibiting direct actions against the insurer. The Court
acknowledged the forum's substantial interest in the controversy and upheld
the application of forum law.20
Most recently, in Richards v. United States,2 1 the Supreme Court
reiterated its view that traditional conflicts rules are not imposed on the
states by the full faith and credit clause, and that the governmental interest
In
analysis of choice of law questions is constitutionally acceptable.2
of
the
for
the
application
deciding that the Federal Tort Claims Act called
choice of law rule of the state where the negligence occurred, even if this
resulted in not applying the substantive law of the place of injury,23 the
Court recognized a recent tendency of some states to "depart from the
1r)Id. at 550.
18 See Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong": Torts and the Conflict of Laws,
34 WAsHr. L. Rv.388, 397 (1959)...
17
See id. at 547. In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
306 U.S. 493 (1939), California was the place of injury and Massachusetts the place
of contracting. Again, the Court upheld California's application of its compensation
statute. Accord, Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947).
18 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
19
LA. REV. STAT. ANNT. § 22:655 (1959). A "direct action!' statute allows injured persons to bring actions against the insurer without first obtaining a judgment
against the insured.
20 348 U.S. at 73. It has been suggested that the Court's position may be changing
even in fraternal benefit insurance cases, in which the Court has been most rigid and
literal in its application of the full faith and credit clause. The suggestion is based
on the fact that in its most recent decision in this line, Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), the Court divided 5-4. Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581, 595-96 (1953);
Currie, supra note 13, at 61-65.
21369 U.S. 1 (1962).
22
"Where more than one state has sufficiently substantial contact with the
activity in question, the forum state, by analysis of the interests possessed by the
states involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of
one or another state having such an interest in the multi-state activity." Id. at 15.
23The result was application of the law of the place of injury, but only because
the choice of law rule of the state where the negligence occurred pointed to that law.
Id. at 15-16.
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general conflicts rule in order to take into account the interests of the
State having significant contact with the parties to the litigation." 24 It
stated that there was "no compelling reason to saddle the Act with an
interpretation that would prevent the federal courts from implementing
25
Yet, the present majority
this policy in choice-of-law rules . ...
dismissed Richards as neither relevant nor persuasive.26
It is difficult to see why the court refused to apply the governmental
interest approach in the present case; there is nothing unusual about the
interests involved. New York's primary interest arises from the fact that
the decedent was and his dependents are its domiciliaries 2 7 Particularly
when the decedent was the breadwinner, the amount of the wrongful death
recovery may be crucial to the welfare of the dependents and may determine
whether they become charges of the state. In upholding the direct action
statute in Watson,28 the Court focused on the impact of the injury on
domiciliaries of the forumr 2 9 The analogous interest of the forum should
be entitled to great weight in the present case.30
New York has an additional interest stemming from its relationship
with defendant carrier, which does much business in the state.3 1 Decedent
purchased his ticket in New York, and the fatal flight departed from a New
York airport.2 An essential concern of any state in regard to the activities of a common carrier within its borders is the safety of the carrier's
operations. Since one of the recognized functions of tort liability is to
encourage a high degree of care, New York has a legitimate interest in
maintaining the threat of negligence liability undiminished by an arbitrary
damage limitation.P
According to the Richards case,3 4 the governmental interest approach
requires New York to justify application of its own law only by a showing
of legitimate interest; 35 but even if New York's interests must outweigh
24 369 U.S. at 12. The cases cited by the Court as demonstrative of this trend
away from traditional choice of law rules involved tort situations in which the forum
applied its own law rather than the law of the place of injury. See Grant v. McAuliffe,
41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) ; Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc. 249 Minn. 376,
82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); Haumnschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95
N.W.2d 814 (1959).
25 369 U.S. at 12-13.
26
2

Instant case at 136.

2

Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).

7 Id. at 144 (dissenting opinion).

2

8

9 Id. at 72.

30 The fact that the forum was the residence of the parties was also adverted to
in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 867, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953); Schmidt v.
Driscoll Hotel Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 380, 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (1957); Haumschild v.
Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 137, 95 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1959).
Continental
31
lInstant case at 143 (dissenting opinion).
82 Ibid.
33
3

See ibid.

4 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
35 See note 22 supra. See generally Currie, mipra note 13, for discussion of the

view that the forum need only have a legitimate interest to apply its own law.
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those of Massachusetts,38 this requirement is satisfied in the present case.
Massachusetts' sole interest is the protection of the carrier, a Massachusetts
corporationY However, the airline conducted a multistate operation and
must have been aware that a crash could occur in one of the many states
having no statutory limitation of liability.38 The contention that the carrier
relied to any significant extent on the Massachusetts damage limitation to
assure its financial security is groundless.
In areas of the law other than torts, entrenched choice of law rules
have been supplanted by the governmental interest analysis. The place
of contracting or the place of performance for a long while dictated choice
of law in contract cases,39 but the Supreme Court has indicated that these
particular factors are not constitutional standards governing choice of
law.40 Although rejection of such mechanical rules introduces some uncertainty into choice of law questions, if the Court has accepted this uncertainty in commercial law, where the need for predictability is great,4 '
there is little reason to expect the Court to strike down the governmental
interest approach to choice of law in tort cases.
The present decision is understandable only as an ill-advised attempt
to avoid forum-shopping by constitutionally requiring a uniform choice of
law rule, the premise being that virtually all jurisdictions have chosen to
apply the law of the place of injury. In the present case, the full faith
and credit clause was applied to a foreign statute, but the clause appears
to apply with equal force to both statutory and decisional law of foreign
jurisdictions.4 The court gave no indication that its decision was based
on some peculiarity of wrongful death actions, and no logical basis for
special treatment appears if wrongful death statutes are viewed in historical
perspective as rectifying an anomaly in the common law. Therefore, in
an action for personal injuries incurred in a foreign state, should the forum
apply its own law which conflicts with the negligence standard of the foreign jurisdiction, consistency would require the court again to find a full
36It has been argued that the proper approach in terms of governmental interest is a weighing of the interests of the states involved to determine which state has
the most substantial connection. Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of
Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHL L. REv. 463, 474-79 (1960).
37 Cf. 74 HAnv. L. REv. 1652, 1654 (1961).
38 Fourteen states still retain damage limitations in their wrongful death statutes.
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 135 (1961).
39 See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943); REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 332-374 (1934).
40
In Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, supra note 39, at 316, the Court, in
deciding that New York could apply its insurance regulations to companies whose
contracts were made in and losses paint from Illinois, said, "the question in earlier
cases became involved by conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting or of performance. More recently it has been recognized that a state may
have substantial interests . . . regardless of these isolated factors"'
(Frankfurter, J., dis41 See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 615-18 (1951)
senting) ; Cheatham, supra note 20, at 601.
42

See Currie, supra note 13, at 15-16, and authorities therein cited.
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faith and credit violation. Such pervasive federal control of choice of law
severely impinges upon the states' ability to implement the goals of their
judicial systems, 43 and cuts off experimentation in the formulation of a
young and developing body of law.4 Furthermore, to make a particular
territorial contact determinative of the choice of law is, in the context of
modem air travel, to rely on the fortuitous and make the law appear unnecessarily capricious. Even if the avoidance of forum-shopping is the
primary goal, there is no reason why it cannot be achieved by a rule that
calls for the application of the law of the state with the most substantial
interests. 45 In many cases, this will be the place of injury. Such a rule
would compel the forum to engage in the often difficult process of weighing
competing state interests. It would, however, lead to a more rational choice

of law.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-UsE OF ICC

FOR
EcoXoMIo JUSTIFICATION PROHIBITED BY ICC To HELP PREVENT
CERTIFICATES

INTERSTATE ROUTING OF INTRASTATE SHIPMENTS WITHOUT

EVASION OF STATE'S REGULATORY POWER
A motor carrier "tacked" I several Interstate Commerce Commission
grants of authority to ship between destinations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and shipped between points in Pennsylvania, going through but
not stopping in New Jersey. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, alleging that the carrier's interstate activities were a subterfuge to
evade state regulation, petitioned the ICC 2 to prohibit the shipments. The
Commission found no justification for the interstate routing and held that
the shipments were intrastate in character 3 and unauthorized by the ICC
certificates; it did not grant the relief requested but merely ordered the
43

See Cheatham, snpra note 20, at 588.

44Ibid.

See Hill, supra note 36, at 493 n.126a, for discussion of the RESTATEMENT
CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent Draft No. 6, 1960), which implements this
approach in contracts cases.
45

(SECOND),

I See generally Bernard, Tacking or Combining of Interstate Operating Rights,
26 ICC PRAc. J. 521 (1959).
2
Upon complaint in writing to the Commission by any . . . State board,
the Commission may investigate whether any motor carrier . . .
has failed to comply with any provision of this chapter, or with any requirement established pursuant thereto. If the Commission, after notice and
hearing, finds upon any such investigation that the motor carrier . . . has

failed to comply with any such provision or requirement, the Commission
shall issue an appropriate order to compel the carrier . . . to comply
therewith.

Interstate Commerce Act, Part II (Motor Carrier Act of 1935) §204(c), 49 Stat.
546, 49 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1958).
3
This is another example of ICC policy to look to substance rather than form.
See, e.g., United States v. Drum, 368 U.S. 370 (1962), 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1028.
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carrier to cease and desist from using its certificates to justify the unauthorized activities. The Commission left further regulation to the state,
but indicated that federal power could be used to supplement ineffective
state attempts to enforce its legitimate regulations. Hudson Transp. Co.,
No. MC-C-2671, ICC, March 19, 1962.
Prior to 1959, a number of state courts had held that they had jurisdiction to determine whether interstate routing was a subterfuge subject
to state regulation.4 And, although there is no doubt that commerce
between two points in one state through another state is interstate commerce, 5 the Supreme Court held in Eichholz v. Public Serv. Comm'n 6 that
the state may regulate when there has been no exercise of federal authority
over this commerce. In 1959, however, in a case in which there had been
ICC certification-Service Storage & Tran4er Co. v. Virginia-the
Supreme Court held that the ICC has primary jurisdiction to determine
7
whether operations under its certificates are bona fide.
The PUC satisfied the requirements of the Service decision by petitioning the ICC for a finding that the carrier's operations were unauthorized
by its certificate. Thus, since a determination of lack of ICC authority
removes the Commission "shield" and leaves the situation equivalent to
that in which there had been no exercise of federal authority, the state,
under the Eichholz rule, now is empowered to regulate the operations
In permitting the state to attempt to regulate, the Commission recognized
that carriage between points in one state through another competes with
and generally affects the state's administration of intrastate commerce.
Only the physical interstate movement sets these operations apart from
those which are normally subject to state control. Although it is inevitable
4
E.g., Clark v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 209 Md. 121, 120 A.2d 363 (1956);
Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 163 Pa. Super. 215, 60 A.2d 589
(1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 925 (1949); Blackmore v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 120
Pa. Super. 437, 183 Ati. 115 (1936).
5 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II (Motor Carrier Act of 1935) § 203 (a) (10),
49 Stat. 544, 49 U.S.C. § 303 (a) (10) (1958), Dohrn Transfer Co. v. Hoegh, 116 F.
Supp. 177 (S.D. Iowa 1953); accord, Eastern Carrier Corp. v. United States, 31
F. Supp. 232 (M.D. Pa. 1939); cf. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334
U.S. 653 (1948). The fact that the interstate commerce is not bona fide has no
effect on this issue. "It is obvious that if a carrier by motor vehicle transports commodities across state lines it is engaged in interstate commerce. Any such transportation is subject to the commerce power of Congress, whether the motive be to
evade the orders of a state commission or not." Eastern Carrier Corp. v. United
States, supra at 236.
6306 U.S. 268 (1939).

7359 U.S. 171 (1959); accord, Jones Motor Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 361 U.S. 11 (1959). The Court distinguished Eichholz v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 268, modified, 306 U.S. 623 (1939), because in that case the carrier
had not received an ICC certificate and therefore there had not been an exercise of
federal authority. 359 U.S. at 178-79. While it is not clear that §204(c) of the
Motor Carrier Act gave the ICC power to determine whether the interstate aspects
are bona fide, the Supreme Court read this power into the section by construing
failure to comply with Commission requirements as meaning abuse of the certificate.
Id. at 179.
8
Eichholz v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra note 7.
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that some interstate commerce will interfere with local concerns, the inter9
ference is justified to protect commerce only when the interstate transportation is bona fide.
Although the ICC in the present case clearly had the power to leave
further regulation of the shipments to the state, before making this disposition it should have examined the effectiveness of the remedies available
10
The wisdom of its abstention
to the state to enforce its regulatory power.
in favor of state enforcement may well depend on the efficacy of the remedies
left to the state after the holding in Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.,"
which invalidated state enforcement that interfered with authorized interstate commerce. Thus, the most effective state remedy would be suspension
of the carrier's privilege of using the state's highways until the authorized
activities are discontinued; a carrier would be unlikely to risk suspension
2
A general suspension,
affecting a major part of its route and revenues.'
however, would also exclude the carrier's authorized interstate trucking
through that state and would be invalid since only the ICC has the power
13
A suspension limited to the
to suspend authorized interstate commerce.
specific trucks used in unauthorized operations would likewise be invalid
because the same trucks are normally used for both authorized and unauthorized interstate operations. One valid and effective method of enforcement would be to stop the unauthorized shipments from reentering the
14
state, but stringent border policing is impractical because of its high cost.
A system of fines directed at unauthorized operations and set high enough
to make it uneconomical for the carrier to continue such operations would
not be tantamount to a suspension of interstate carriage, even though the
weight of the fines might force an offending carrier into insolvency, because
by simply complying with the state's order the carrier can avoid the fines
and protect its authorized interstate operating rights. Since the Commission has already found the operations both unauthorized and unjustified, the
ICC should not protect a carrier that refuses to comply with state regulation, and the partial revocation of operating rights effected by these fines
would be valid.
Nevertheless, since the state may have difficulty fashioning an effective
and constitutional method of enforcing its regulatory power, the ICC should
9 See Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case),
234 U.S. 342 (1914).
10 See instant case at 10.
11348 U.S. 61 (1954).
12 The unauthorized activities are often only a small percentage of the interstate
carrier's business. E.g., Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 171,
176 (1959) (questioned activities only 3% of petitioner's business).
"3Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
14 For example, in the present case, shipments were made to 35 different destinations, through many points of entrance and exit into and from the state. Since
numerous carriers are allegedly engaged in similar activities, the cost of border patrol
would be prohibitive. See Petition for Reconsideration of Complainant, instant case,
pp. 2-3, 9.
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itself ban the unauthorized activities when, as in the present case, the state
so requests. Even if the state has an adequate remedy, ICC refusal to heed
the state request will encourage needless litigation in federal and state
forums because the offending carrier will probably test the validity of state
enforcement measures of questionable constitutionality. Since whenever
the carrier is operating under color of ICC authority, the case must, in the
first instance, come before the Commission, 15 the additional litigation can
be avoided by ICC enforcement of the state's request to compel termination
of the unauthorized activities. Furthermore, the broader range of remedies
available to the ICC 16 than to the state will insure speedier compliance
with ICC orders; the Commission has, for example, the power to suspend
17
or revoke the entire interstate operating privileges of an offending carrier.
The only disadvantage of ICC disposition of subterfuge cases is the burden
placed on the Commission to enforce what are ultimately state interests.
However, the ICC has an obligation to police interstate commerce and to
eliminate unauthorized traffic,' 8 and Congress has directed the Commission
to cooperate with the states whenever a carrier uses interstate operating
rights improperly. 19 The elimination of unauthorized, unregulated traffic
is consonant with the objectives of the National Transportation Policy 20
to foster sound economic conditions in transportation, 21 and through federalstate cooperation 2 to preserve a sound national transportation system.p
Thus, the additional burden cast on the ICC to police cease and desist
orders issued in subterfuge cases is justified by the achievement of important
federal objectives as well as by the elimination of possibly fruitless state
attempts to enforce its regulatory power. In addition, direct ICC prohibition of the unauthorized acts in the initial proceeding, instead of a mere
prohibition of the use of ICC certificates to justify those acts, will avoid
the possibility, adverted to in the present case, 24 that the Commission will
ultimately be called on to supplement ineffective state enforcement efforts.
15 Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 171, 176 (1959).
1649 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958) ; Service Storage
& Transfer Co. v. Virginia, supra note 15. See also Vincze v. ICC, 267 F.2d 577

(9th Cir. 1959).
17 Ibid.
1849 Stat. 551 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §306(a)(1) (1958).
19 49 Stat 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1958).
20
National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. Preamble

(1958).
21 Ibid.
22 "If, therefore, motor carriers persistently and repeatedly violate the laws .of
a state, we know of no reason why the Commission may not protect the state's
interest, either on the Commission's own initiative or on complaint of the state."
Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 65 (1954) (dictum).
2 National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940),

(1958).
24

Instant case at 10.

49 U.S.C. Preamble
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LABOR LAW-INJUCTIoN ISSUED BY STATE COURT LACKING
JURmSDITION BECAUSE OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION CANNOT BE THE
BASIS OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CONVICTION

An employer obtained an ex parte state court injunction against a
union's peaceful picketing. The union's attorney sought a hearing to
contest the state court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, contending that
the picketing was "arguably" protected by sections 7 and 8 of the Labor
Management Relations Act 1 and that therefore the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction. 2 Upon learning that no hearing
could be obtained for over a week, the attorney advised the union to continue picketing. As a consequence, the enjoining court held him in criminal
contempt. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the Ohio state
courts,3 but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 4 that an
injunction issued by a state court lacking jurisdiction over the subject
matter because of federal preemption cannot be the basis of a criminal contempt conviction; therefore, conviction of the attorney without granting him
a hearing on the preemption issue was a denial of due process5 In re
Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
It was early established that an erroneous court order issued by a court
having jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter had to be obeyed
until overturned; 6 but if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the order was void and could not give rise to a criminal contempt conviction. 7 However, in 1947 the Supreme Court declared in
161 Stat. 140 (1947),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1958), as amended, 29

U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. II, 1960).

2 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Guss v.
Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346
U.S. 485 (1953). The employer alleged that the picketing violated a "no-strike"
clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and that the state and federal courts
had concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962) ; Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 368 U.S. 95
(1962).
3 Petition of Green, 172 Ohio St. 269, 175 N.E.2d 59 (1961).
4
The opinion can be read as holding only that due process requires a hearing
on the preemption issue. However, a prerequisite to such a holding is a determination that an injunction issued by a state court lacking jurisdiction over the subject
matter because of federal preemption cannot be the basis of a criminal contempt
conviction. Although the majority treats this as being settled by United Gas Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951), instant case at 692, the
present decision is the first clearly to establish this principle. See text accompanying notes 13-14 infra.
5
Justices Harlan and Clark concurred in a separate opinion. Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
6
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922); Western Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Gotfried, 136 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1943); cf. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563

(1906).

7
re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Cox, The Void Order and the Duty To
Obey, 16 U. Cxx. L. REv. 86 (1948).
Civil contempt is remedial in nature. Consequently, violation of an erroneous
order does not give rise to a claim for damages, since the complaining party was not
entitled to the relief in the first place. Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14 (1887). See
generally Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904).
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United States v. United Mine Workers,8 that all court orders were to be
obeyed unless the issuing court's claim to jurisdiction was "frivolous." 9
The meaning of "frivolous" was left unclear; it was apparent, nevertheless,
that the Court intended to eliminate the lack-of-jurisdiction defense to
criminal contempt in all but the most extreme cases of jurisdictional
deficiency.'
In resurrecting this defense, the majority in the present case
summarily disposed of the Mine Workers decision, stating in a brief footnote "' that Mine Workers involved a federal restraining order and presented no question of federal preemption 2
The majority instead placed considerable reliance on United Gas
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,' 3 a 1951 companion case
to Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd.14 Although the Court in Gas Workers did reverse a contempt conviction when the state court lacked jurisdiction to issue the
injunction, the reversal took place more or less automatically on the basis
of the opinion in the main case-Street Employees-, which considered
only the problem of whether a state statute proscribing strikes that would
interrupt essential public utilities services was invalid by reason of federal
preemption. The Court never explicitly reached the issue of whether a
state court could base a criminal contempt conviction on the violation of
an order made without jurisdiction because of federal preemption.' 5 Unlike
Mine Workers, the Gas Workers decision did not treat jurisdiction to
decide the underlying dispute as a problem distinct from jurisdiction to
convict for criminal contempt.' 6
8 330 U.S. 258 (1947).

9 Id. at 293.
10 This was the interpretation of Mine Workers adopted by the lower courts.
See, e.g., Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004
(1957), a contempt proceeding in which defendant's proof that a jurisdictional fraud
had been perpetrated on the enjoining court was held inadmissible.
11
Instant case at 692 n.1.
12 The Mine Workers case concerned an injunction issued by a federal court
against a threatened strike by the United Mine Workers at a time when the mines
were under federal control. The union disregarded the order, claiming that under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act the court lacked jurisdiction to issue it. Six members
of the Court agreed that all court orders not based on a "frivolous" claim to jurisdiction had to be obeyed. Alternatively, a majority of the Court held that the

Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition of federal court injunctions in labor disputes was

inapplicable when the federal government was the employer involved. In the present
case, Justices Harlan and Clark regarded the Mine Workers "frivolous" claim
rule as controlling. However, they thought the actions of the union's attorney were
not contemptuous because the attorney, opposing counsel, and the enjoining court
allegedly had agreed that the jurisdictional issue would be tested by a refusal to
honor the injunction. Instant case at 696.
13 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
14 Ibid.
15 Mr. Justice Harlan indicates that the contempt problem was not argued before
the Court in Gas Workers, and suggests that Wisconsin could have upheld the contempt conviction if its state law was in accord with the Mine Workers rule. Instant
case at 695 (separate opinion).
'6Jurisdiction to decide the underlying dispute and jurisdiction to convict for
contempt were treated as distinct problems in Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957), and Town & Country Motors, Inc. v.
Teamsters Union, 355 Mich. 26, 94 N.W.2d 442 (1959).
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The Mine Workers rule, compelling adherence to a court order issued
by a court with a "nonfrivolous" claim to jurisdiction, has little merit in
the present situation.' 7 A union has no means of collaterally attacking an
order issued by a state court lacking jurisdiction by reason of federal preemption.' s If, pending appellate review or NLRB action to set aside the
injunction, the union cannot violate the state order without facing criminal
contempt charges, it will have to cease picketing and see its economic
bargaining power weakened and, perhaps, its strike broken.' 9 In such
circumstances the state courts and not the NLRB would actually be making
crucial decisions affecting federal labor policy, thus undercutting the basic
objective of the recently developed preemption doctrine-2 0-to have an
expert agency develop a uniform body of precedent 2 ' in disputes arising
out of activity "arguably" protected or prohibited by sections 7 and 8 of
the LMRA.2
By reinstating the pre-Mine Workers lack-of-jurisdiction defense, the
Court in the present case gives a union a limited right to test the validity
of a state court injunction, thereby reducing the danger of state court
interference 2 3 with activities not properly the subject of state concern. If
the requisite hearing on the criminal contempt charge establishes the lack of
state court jurisdiction, the union cannot be punished. Even if the enjoining court erroneously concludes from the hearing that it has jurisdiction,
the union can continue to violate the order with impunity if its contention
will be upheld on appeal. In either case, of course, the union runs the
considerable risk of incurring criminal contempt liability should the enjoining court's jurisdiction ultimately be sustained. This risk coupled with
17 See Town & Country Motors, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, mipra note 16, at 54-55,
94 N.W.2d at 456-57; Ex parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522, 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Ex
parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214, 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Cox, The Void Order and
the Duty To Obey, 16 U. CHL L. REv. 86, 111-15 (1948). But cf. Aladdin Indus.,
Inc. v. Associated Transp., Inc., 45 Tenn. App. 329, 323 S.W.2d 222 (1958), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 865 (1959).
18 A union cannot obtain a federal injunction against enforcement of the state
court order. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
However, in Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954), the Court allowed
the NLRB to enjoin a state court proceeding when the Board had issued an order
in the same controversy. Removal to a federal district court is not available even
though the state court proceedings reveal the possible existence of an unfair labor
practice. American Optical Co. v. Andert, 108 F. Supp. 252 (D. Mo. 1952) ; Dynamic
Mfrs., Inc. v. Local 614, General Drivers, 103 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mich. 1952).
19 See Michelman, State Power To Govern Concerted Employee Activities,
74 HARv. L. Rxv. 641, 649 (1961).
20 The preemption doctrine was first articulated in Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485 (1953), and has been elaborated in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959).
21 See cases cited note 2 supra; Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and
State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 6, 25 (1959).
2261 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. II, 1960).
23 See Hays, State Courts and Federal Preemption, 23 Mo. L. RFv. 373 (1958).
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the difficulty of establishing the jurisdictional defect 24 should insure that
unions will not lightly disregard state court orders. Consequently, the
present decision effectuates the policy underlying the preemption doctrine
respect
without unduly undermining the ability of state courts to maintain
25
for judicial authority by means of the criminal contempt power.

LABOR LAW-REPESETATION- ELECTION PETITON BAR 1D TO
PARTIES TO COLECTivE BARGAIN-ING CONTRACT FOR DuRmTIOx OF
CONTRACT
Three years after signing a five-year contract with the incumbent
union, employer petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for a
representation election. The Board held, with two members dissenting,
that an employer and an incumbent union who are parties to a collective
bargaining contract are barred for the duration of that contract from
submitting representation election petitions. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
137 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (May 25, 1962).
Board rules implementing the Wagner Act' allowed employees and
unions to petition for a representation election even while a collective
bargaining contract purported to bind the employer and the incumbent
union.2 Although this right of petition enhanced the employees' freedom
to choose a desired bargaining representative, it had the undesirable effect
of lessening the industrial stability that could result from a collective bargaining contract. To redress what it considered an imbalance between these
conflicting aims, the Board ruled in 1939 than an existing contract would
bar an election petition for a reasonable period of time.3 More recently
it resolved a closely related problem by permitting a new bargaining repre24 State courts may validly claim jurisdiction in cases involving violence,
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Automobile Workers v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956), when the issue is the
enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962),
or when the interstate commerce involved falls below the NLRB's jurisdictional standards, Labor Management Relations Act, § 701, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164
(Sfupp. II, 1960).
25 For an excellent exposition on the necessity of the contempt power, see
Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).

'National

Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 141-68 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-87 (Supp. I, 1959).
2 The Wagner Act was silent about the means for placing a representation question before the Board. In its 1936 Rules & Regulations, series 1, art. III, § 1, the
Board gave the right to petition to "any employee or any person or labor organization acting on his behalf." The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act recognized this right. 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1). Employers first received the right to file representation petitions in 1939. NLRB Rules & Regulations, ser. 2, art. III, §§ 1-3 (1939).
3
National Sugar Ref. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1939).
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sentative elected at the close of the bar period to demand a new contract
4
even though the old agreement had not yet expired.
Over the years since its promulgation of the contract bar rule, the
Board has varied the length of the bar period,5 weighing in each instance the
stability which a bar for the entire contract period would promote against
the employees' freedom to choose bargaining representatives. 6 In its most
recent formulation of the rule-PacificCoast Ass'n of Pulp & PaperMfrs.7
-, the Board, aware that other rules and decisions had reduced employee
freedom of choice, 8 departed from a bar period measured by the customary
contract period in the particular industry 9 and imposed a maximum of
two years. Since the trend had been toward longer term contracts,' 0 this
decision in many cases reduced the bar period and enhanced employee freedom of choice. By holding in the present case that a collective bargaining
agreement is now to bar employer petitions for its entire duration, the Board
restricts the rule of Pacific Coast to promote stability without, in its view,
encroaching on "the proper exercise of the employees' freedom of choice." I,
Unlike other representation petitions,' 2 an employer petition need not
be supported by a showing of interest of thirty percent of the employees in
the bargaining unit; 13 proof of a claim for recognition by a union or an
employee suffices. 14 Since the Board does not investigate whether there
is any support in the bargaining unit for such a claim, single employees
can sometimes be induced to initiate the election process by presenting
spurious claims. 15 Moreover, the requisite claim for recognition may be
manufactured by an employer petition alleging that an incumbent union
4

American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953); see Cox, The Legal Nature

of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1, 10 (1958); Freidin, The
Board, the "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 61, 64, 82-84 (1958).

5See Freidin, supra note 4, at 63-64.
6

See, e.g., Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927, 929 (1947); Owens-Illinois

Pacific Coast Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 990, 995-96 (1941).
7121 N.L.R.B. 990 (1958).

8Id. at 992. In Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958), the
Board had limited the period during which a contract could be attacked by an

election petition and had allowed greater modifications of the contract to be made

in mid-term without destroying its effect as a bar. In Hershey Chocolate Corp.,
121 N.L.R.B. 901 (1958), the Board had clarified the "schism" doctrine, making it

more difficult for the bar to be lifted because of intra-union conflict.
9
E.g., Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1953); General Motors
Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1140 (1953).
10 Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990, 991 (1958).

11 Instant case at 3. As this Comment was going to press, the Board overruled

Pacific Coast and extended the maximum bar period to three years. However, it
recognized the continuing validity of the instant decision. General Cable Corp., 139
N.L.R.B. No. 111, 51 L.R.R.M. 1444 (Nov. 19, 1962). In support of the three year
bar, the Board noted the great number of three-year contracts, the AFL-CIO binding
no-raid agreements, and the increase in member control over internal union affairs
facilitated by the 1959 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
12 NLRB Statements of Procedure § 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (Supp. 1962).

13 Ibid. See Felton Oil Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 1033 (1948).
14 Labor Management Relations Act §9(c), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1) (B) (1958).
15
LIEBERMAN, UNIONS BEFORE THE BAR 316 (1955).
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no longer has majority support. The Board regards the resulting union
challenge to that assertion as a claim for recognition. 16 Consequently, the
employer petition is a simple device for questioning union majority support. 17 Nevertheless, it is seldom used. Of the approximately 10,000
representation petitions filed annually with the NLRB, only about 700 are
filed by employers.' 8 About 200 result in elections, and in about half of
these there has been previous recognition or certification in the bargaining
unit.' 9 It is not known how many of these employer petitions are filed, as
in the present case, after an unexpired contract has run two years, by an
employer who doubts that the union has the support of the majority of
the employees.
In certain infrequent but critical situations, the employer petition may
be of significant value as an instrument of employee choice. For example,
if an incumbent union challenged by a rival union has lost the sure support
of fifty percent of the employees but the rival has not yet gained the necessary showing of employee interest to petition for or to win an election,20
neither the rival nor the incumbent union would petition. The incumbent
benefits from a maintenance of the status quo; the rival fears defeat and the
consequent barring of another election for one year. 21 Moreover, the incumbent may be able to so pressure its members as to prevent an effective
rival union campaign for additional support; 2 meanwhile, the rival union's
campaign may impair the incumbent's ability adequately to represent the
employees.
Thus, neither freedom of choice nor stability is being promoted.
Allowance of an employer petition and the ensuing election would tend to
open the channels of communication, reduce the effectiveness of incumbent
union pressure on employees, and increase the possibility of free employee
choice of a desired representative or no union representative at all.
16See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 846 (1960); Dade Drydock
Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 532 (1959); American Lawn Mower Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1589
(1954). The reasonableness of the employer's basis for questioning the union's
majority status is usually not examined by the Board. Fred Mueller, Inc., 48
L.R.R.M. 1178 (1961) ; Continental So. Corp., 83 N.L.R.B. 668 (1949).
17

MILLIs-BR0WN, FROm THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY

161, 248-49, 530

(1950).
3s See Table 5 in volumes 20 through 26, NLRB ANN. REP'. (1955-61). The
1959 amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act, §8(b)(7)(C), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (Supp. I, 1959), proscribes recognitional picketing unless an
election petition is filed within thirty days. Since employer petition rights need no
longer resolve such recognitional claims, there should be some decrease in the number
of employer petitions. This appears to have been the case. Compare 24 NLRB
ANN. REP. Table 5 (1959) with 26 NLRB ANN. REP. Table 5 (1961).
19 Krislov, Employer Petitiows for NLRB Representation Elections, 12 LAB. L.J.
293, 301 (1961).
20 In Lewis, Employer Petitions-New York and Federal-A Comparison,
N.Y.U. 5TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LAOR 249, 250-55 (1952), an analogous situation is said to be the motivating force for the original granting of employer petition
rights.
21 See Labor Management Relations Act § 9(c) (3), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (1958).
22 See Arlan's Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 48 L.R.R.M. 1731, 1732 (1961);
Underwriters Salvage Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 601 (1948).
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In a second possible situation, no rival union is challenging the incumbent, but the employer is confronted with a bargaining representative
maldng demands under an existing contract when it is doubtful that the
majority of the employees currently support that representative.2 3 Such
doubts are no defense to a claim that the employer will not administer the
existing contract; 2 to protect himself from a charge of unfair labor practice, the employer must negotiate with that representative. For an employee to effect a change in representative, he must muster thirty percent
of the bargaining unit, either through his own efforts or by enlisting the
aid of a rival union, in order to petition. The employer petition is a far
simpler means to settle the uncertainty as to employee desires and would
allow the employer to forego bargaining with an unsupported representative.
Nevertheless, an employer might also petition for an election that
cannot be justified by a good faith doubt of a union's representative status.2 5
The campaigning attendant upon an election resulting from a well-timed
petition can revive old grievances, create new ones, and induce employee
dissatisfaction with the incumbent union. But no legislative fiat demands
that the Board grant every petition for an election. The Board need only
hold an election when it finds that a "question of representation" exists. 2 6
There is ample room for flexibility in this determination; 27 the Board
should grant an employer petition only when necessary to give effect to
employee free choice.28 In the rival union situation, 29 evidence that the
incumbent union was pressuring its members in order to restrict rival
union campaigning, or that campaign unrest was adversely affecting contract
administration, would constitute some justification for granting an employer
petition. In the doubtful support situation, ° employee disregard of the
incumbent's agreements and ineffective contract administration might similarly justify an election. By precluding this flexible approach, the instant
decision reveals that the Board is still operating in the mechanistic manner
for which it was criticized after it adopted the rigid two-year bar rule in
31
the Pacific Coast case.
Prior to the present decision, the Board had enforced the provision
governing duration less rigidly than the other obligations of a collective
23 Lewis, supra note 20, at 258, argues that the Taft-Hartley expansion of the
employer's petition rights covered just this situation.
24
Hexton Furniture Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 342 (1955); cf. NLRB v. Marcus
Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), enforcing 126 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1960).
25 See Lewis, supra note 20, at 259-71; LEBERmAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at
315; MILis-BRowN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 530-31.
26
Labor Management Relations Act § 9(c) (1), 61 Stat 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1) (1958).
27The contract bar policy is one "which the Board in its discretion may apply
or waive as the facts of a given case may demand in the interest of stability and
fairness . . . ." NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950).

28

See 1 NLRB,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

LMRA, 1947, at 473 (1948)

(Senate Minority Report); MMLIs-BRowN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 530-31.
29 See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
30 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
31 Freidin, supra note 4, at 67-69.
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bargaining agreement.32 In a sense it is the contract bar rule which determines how long the agreement will be binding,33 and the bar period has
generally been shorter than the agreement's purported duration. By
making the duration of the agreement binding on the signatory parties,
the Board in the present case increases the identification of the collective
bargaining agreement with the conventional contract, in which all the
terms, including duration, are equally enforced.3 4 But it is a mistake to
equate the labor contract with the conventional contract for several reasons.
"[N]either the employer nor the employees collectively have the freedom
to disagree. . .

. " 5 Added to this compulsion to agree is the fact that

the employer has no freedom to choose with whom he will bargain. In
addition, conventional contract law is not well suited to contracts in which
the loss of the representative character of a party may void the obligation,
or which rank and file dissatisfaction may render unenforceable. 36 Neither
is contract law well acquainted with the problems of general and flexible
agreements continuing over a long term.37 The importance of these factors
in representation cases is manifested when an election petition results in the
election of a new bargaining agent and a subsequent contract renegotiation.
The employees thereby insure that an unsatisfactory contract, though unexpired, will not be enforced as a conventional contract in disregard of
these dissimilarities.
The Board's approach in the present case, extending the analogy
between the conventional contract and the collective bargaining contract,
may have unfortunate implications for future consideration of the related
problem-must a representative newly elected during the life of the previous
representative's agreement abide by that existing agreement.3 8 Present
rulings that a new contract may be negotiated in this situation 39 may be
altered if the obligations of the parties and the binding effect of the collective bargaining agreement are to be stressed. 40
See instant case at 4 n.7.
See Cox, supra note 4, at 13.
34 The Board declares that the "sole reason for the possible disruption of a contractual relationship is to give effect to the employee's right to freedom of choice.
There is no other valid rationale for the Board's conducting an election in disregard
of the agreement of the parties as to the term thereof or for the Board to permit
32
33

the parties to disregard their own agreement .

. .

."

The Board will not permit

"employers or certified unions to take advantage of whatever benefits may accrue
from the contract with the knowledge that they have an option to avoid their contractual obligations through the device of a petition to the Board for an election."
Instant case at 3-4. (Emphasis added.)
35 Cox, supra note 4, at 3-4.
36 Cf. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LAoR POLIcY 77-81 (1960).
37 Ibid.
38 The original Board answer was apparently affirmative. See New England
Transp. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 130, 138-39 (1936), which was overruled by American
Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953). Freidin, stupra note 4, at 64, asserts that
the validity of the American Seating holding is "not free from doubt.'
39
American Seating Co., supra note 38; see Freidin, supra note 4, at 64; Cox,
supra note 4, at 9.
40 See note 34 supra.
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A possible rationale for such an alteration is that the original election
and contract evidenced the employees' intention to be bound for the duration of the contract if a desired representative administered it. On this
premise, if the Board finds that the employees were primarily dissatisfied
with the administration of the existing agreement, and the new union
appears able to administer that agreement properly, the original agreement
should retain its validity.41 However, the main reason for the employees'
disenchantment with the former incumbent union may have been dissatisfaction with the agreement at its inception. If so, the new union should
be given the right further to effectuate employee free choice by negotiating
a new contract, thereby promoting the industrial peace that results from
employee satisfaction with a collective bargaining agreement.
The difficulties of ascertaining the reason for employee dissatisfaction
will be a major impediment to the Board's adoption of the flexible approach
suggested. The present decision will make parties less able to avoid the
commitments of a collective bargaining agreement by means of representation elections. The increased stability may in some instances be illusory;
whatever stability is achieved may come at too high a cost in terms of
employee free choice.
41 See generally Developments in the Law--The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 H. v.
L. REv. 781, 840-41 (1949) ; Note, The Legal Consequences of Labor Union Schisms,
63 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1423-26 (1950).

